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The Global Positioning System Subsystem (GPS) for International Space Station (ISS) 
was activated April 12,2002 following the installation of the SO truss segment that 
included the GPS antennas on Shuttle mission STS-110. The ISS GPS receiver became 
the primary source for position, velocity, and attitude information for ISS two days after 
activation. The GPS receiver also provides a time reference for manual control of ISS 
time, and will be used for automatic time updates after problems are resolved with the 
output from the receiver. After two years of on-orbit experience, the GPS continues to be 
used as the primary navigation source for ISS; however, enough problems have surfaced 
that the firmware in the GPS attitude code has had to be totally rewritten and new 
algorithms developed, the firmware that processed the time output from the GPS receiver 
had to be rewritten, while the GPS navigation code has had minor revisions. The factors 
contributing to the delivery of a GPS receiver for use on ISS that requires extensive 
operator intervention to function are discussed. Observations from two years worth of 
GPS solutions will also be discussed. The technical solutions to the anomalous GPS 
receiver behavior will be discussed. 
The GPS receiver for ISS is a Space Integrated GPShertial Navigation System (SIGI), 
manufactured by Honeywell (HI). The GPS receiver within the SIGI is a Trimble 
Navigation Force 19. The navigation code within the Force 19 was written by Trimble 
and the attitude code within the Force 19 was written by the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA). The NASA code was derived from Trimble Navigation 
legacy code. The SIGI also contains a System Processor with code written by HI to 
output the GPS receiver messages in the proper protocol required for ISS and includes the 
code that outputs the GPS receiver time. The SIGI was procured as a Commercial Off 
the Shelf item. The following are the lessons learned from the development phase of the 
SIGI that contributed to the delivery of a product that is now requiring an extensive code 
rewrite in order to meet expectations. 
Purchasing a Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) product when the vendor does not have 
both hardware and software processes in place to ensure quality can lead to a poor quality 
product. 
The philosophy of extensive testing of the software will not change the fact that the 
software is poorly designed. 
Unrealistic schedules also contributed to the delivery of a product that did not meet 
expectation. Because the SIGI was incorrectly viewed as essentially a COTS 
procurement and not the development effort it really was, the project schedules were 
optimistic. The unrealistic schedules led to decisions to use as much existing code as 
possible. In hind sight, the attitude determination code should have been written 
completely new to meet ISS needs, rather than trying to use legacy code developed for 
use on aircraft. Specifically, the attitude determination code uses a search technique to 
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solve for integers. This method suspends all output from the receiver while the search 
method searches thru the range of integers. This causes frequent gaps in the position and 
velocity updates. These problems, plus additional problems with the attitude code 
discussed below, caused NASA and to replace the existing integer resolution method 
with a new method. 
The following are the problems encountered using the GPS after delivery was already 
made to the ISS program. 
It was discovered that the time output did not propagate well when the SIGI was tracking 
less than 4 satellites. Additional problems were found when the HI code would jump 
entire GPS epochs when the navigation processor would reset itself. ISS was intending 
to use the time from SIGI as ISS time. The work around established was for operators to 
manually control the clock drift rate of the flight computers using error between onboard 
computed GPS time or ground computed GPS time and ISS clock time. This was an 
unanticipated burden on the operators. The time code has been rewritten. Plots are 
shown comparing the time output from SIGI prior and after the code rewrite. 
Several problems surfaced in the attitude determination code. On two occasions, the 
code output a IEEE 754 Not-A-Number. This caused both the primary and backup ISS 
guidance and navigation computers to stop processing. Attitude control was handed off 
from the US side to the Russian side, resulting in loss of micro-gravity and use of 
propellant supplies for control. High rate communications antennas were pointed 
manually by the ground during the several hours required to re-boot the US computers. 
The attitude determination code also resets itself under certain circumstances which were 
not seen prior to flight. When the code resets itself, it erases all of its memory and needs 
re-initialization. This was another unanticipated burden on the operators. These 
problems caused NASA to pursue re-writing the attitude determination code using a code 
standard. Plots are shown comparing the attitude output from SIGI prior and after the 
code rewrite. 
The problems in the navigation code were more subtle. The GPS receiver was tracking 
satellites through the Earth’s atmosphere which caused significant navigation errors. The 
health messages from the GPS receiver were out of sync with the actual navigation 
message, causing ISS to use solutions that it should have screened. The ionosphere was 
also causing significant errors that were not anticipated. Plots are shown comparing the 
navigation output from SIGI prior and after the code rewrite. The problems caused by 
the ionosphere have not yet been solved. 
In conclusion, the code residing in the GPS receiver for ISS is equally as complicated as 
the code residing in the ISS flight computers. The code within the GPS receiver should 
have been developed with the same rigor as the code residing in the flight computers that 
was developed to the specification of a man rated space vehicle. Since the GPS receiver 
code was not written to such a specification, it had to be rewritten. 
